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Abstract 
This article analyses whether there is a constraint in convicting corporations under the money 
laundering offence. It is almost overlooked by many that corporations too can be found guilty of money 
laundering offences. The focus will be on corporations who have committed money laundering and a 
brief mention on financial crimes such as tax evasion and bribery. Unlike the ‘associated crime groups’ 
and ‘criminal enterprises’, corporate financial crimes comprise of apparent legitimate businesses that 
operates within legal and global markets. In a situation as such, corporations will play the third party to 
a money laundering operation, offering opportunities for managing illicit finances for individuals who are 
incapable of doing it by themselves. Hence, the corporations are usually the primary offenders, agents 
and administrators in facilitating illicit finances. Looking at the features between corporate and 
organised crime, their techniques and structures when committing a crime are similar. But the distinction 
is found in the institutional responses. This article looks at how the two primary issues in money 
laundering criminality; (1) dual criminality limitation and (2) eradication of predicate offence argument 
handle a fictional case involving corporate financial crime. Whether the existing prerequisites of money 
laundering offence can produce successful prosecution under circumstances that are contemporary in 
the crime circles. The analysis enables one to understand the contemporary advancement in the 
methodologies used to launder proceedings as compared to an ideal scenario of a money laundering 
operation involving ‘organised crime groups.’ It also shows how corporations are able to misuse a 
legitimate business structures, arrangements and practices in their criminal enterprise. 
 
Introduction 
 Money laundering offences has often been associated with other serious crimes such as illicit 
drugs, prostitution, gambling and counterfeiting,1 corporate financial crimes (corporate tax fraud (tax 
evasion), corporate bribery)  are most of the time, overlooked or misunderstood by many as a crime 
                                                                
1 Robert J. Souster, Financial Crime and Money Laundering (2nd edn, Global Professional Publishing, 
2013)  
 4 
that bears no relevance to the laundering offence.2 It is also unknown to many that it is possible for a 
company or corporation can convicted under money laundering offences. However, there are additional 
conditions that needs to be taken into consideration when convicting corporations under the laundering 
offence. 
From a business perspective, corporate financial crimes generate more financial advantages 
compared to dealings revolving other serious crimes.3The most popular justification, used by corporate 
offenders, is found to be closely link to a nation’s poor economic situation and governmental policy 
which consequently results to high level of corruption.4 It is an inevitable act and procedure that local 
and foreign companies must commit in order to survive unfavourable economic, social and bureaucratic 
conditions in the commercial circle.5 Committing these crimes, in a way has aid in the profitability and 
success of the corporation and refusals to do so may cost them great financial losses and business 
opportunities. The more significant effect it may lead to lesser development and investment in some 
countries. 
 On the other hand, corporate financial crime has an encircling detrimental effect that harms the 
economic system as well as the system of governance.6 It is usually a corporate crime has been 
committed, the offender’s proceeds to launder the money with the intention wiping the money ‘clean’. 
That way, it leaves no trace of the money trail and they are able to utilise fully the money or property 
they have laundered from the corporate fraud, tax evasion and etc. Whilst the corporation benefits, the 
harmful effect resonates with every spectrum of an economy. It undermines the legitimacy of the private 
                                                                
2 Nicholas Lord, Karin van Wingerde and Liz Campbell, ‘Organising the Monies of Corporate Financial 
Crimes via Organisational Structures: Ostensible Legitimacy, Effective Anonymity and Third-Party 
Facilitation’ [2018] 17(8) Administrative Science  
3 Karen Harrison, Nicholas Ryder, The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom 
(Routledge, 2016)  
4 P Gottschalk, H Solli-Sather, ‘Financial crime in business organisations: an empirical study’ [2011] 
18(1) Journal of Financial Crime 76 
5 Karen Harrison, Nicholas Ryder, The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the United Kingdom 
(Routledge, 2016)  
6 Robert J. Souster, Financial Crime and Money Laundering (2nd edn, Global Professional Publishing 
Limited 2013)  
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sector,7 undermines the integrity of financial markets,8loss of control of economic policy,9 economic 
distortion and instability,10 loss of revenue11 and risks to privatization efforts12 and reputational risk.13 
This in turn, would diminish development and economic growth, where legitimate global opportunities 
are constricted by international corporations with undesirable reputations and short term goals. The 
confidence of the general public in the financial markets as well as the commercial sector will be lost. 
Once a nations’ reputation is damaged, it will be challenging to rebuild the confidence of the public. In 
short, corporate financial crimes and money laundering undermines the connection between public and 
the system of governance.14 Hence, regardless of the justifications proposed, it has overall detrimental 
effects on the society as well as the nation. Therefore, corporate crimes should not be taken lightly. 
                                                                
7 The laundering process often uses front companies to co-mingle proceeds of illicit activity with 
legitimate funds with the purpose to conceal the ill-gotten gains. Some instances enables front 
companies to supply products below the market value. Thus, the competitive edge over legitimate 
firms may undermine legitimate business to compete against front companies. 
8 The reliance on the proceeds of crime by financial institutions  places them in unstable positions. 
Large sums of laundered money at financial institution may disappear suddenly without any notice 
given through wire transfers. This causes the institution into liquidity problems and runs on banks. 
9 In a country where there is an attendant loss of policy control and frequent money laundering 
schemes that thrive to be unpredictable, it would undeniably make economic policy difficult to 
achieve. Money laundering can heighten monetary instability due to misallocation of resources. This 
is mostly due its operation having artificial distortions in asset and commodity prices. It would also 
lead to inexplicable changes in money demand and increased volatility of international capital flows, 
interest and exchange rates. 
10 Money laundering and financial crime deviate fund from sound investments to low quality 
investments in hopes of concealing their proceeds, thus does not benefit the economic  system of the 
country where the funds are located.  
11 Schemes such tax fraud or tax bribery will diminish government tax revenue and consequently 
harms honest taxpayers. This loss of revenue will cause higher tax rates than what would have been 
if the untaxed proceeds of crime were legitimate. 
12 It may also hinder privatization initiatives by the government and a nation’s financial institution and 
reputation will be tarnished with frequent money laundering and corporate crimes appears. 
13 John McDowell, Gary Noris, ‘The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime’ [2001] 
6(2) Electronic Journal of the US Department of State 
14 Philip M Nichols, ‘The Good Bribe’ [2015] 49UCDL Rev. 682 
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This article seeks to access how well the criminality of money laundering can counter those who commit 
crimes related to corporate finance.  
 
 It is now firmly established in most jurisdictions that criminalising proceeds of crimes has a 
preliminary requirement which is to find a predicate offence.15 In reference to the traditional phrase of 
describing money laundering offence had a ‘dark twin’,16 the ‘dark twin’ is the predicate offence that 
generated the funds to be laundered.17 For instance, theft or robbery is an criminal offence on its own 
and the resulting effect of the offence is of stolen cash and property. The stolen cash and property 
constitute to the proceeds of crime. If the offender to conceal the true source of the stolen cash and 
property, the laundering process will be utilised to legitimise the stolen cash and property. There have 
been discussions on whether if the ‘dark twin’ needs to be proven since there are occurrence where 
the predicate offence may overlap with the process of money laundering.18 Particularly, in corporate 
finance crime, the scheme consists of laundering proceeds that may derived from a legitimate source. 
In other words, law enforcement authorities may find it difficult to find the proceeds are from a ‘criminal 
conduct’. 19  
 Another issue that prosecution may find in a money laundering prosecution is in regard to 
extradition. Laundering scheme as well as the corporate crime which operates on a global scale for 
better concealment and effective concealing of the proceeds and what about.20 It enables them to pick 
a nation with the weak system of governance as well as weak anti-money laundering policies to facilitate 
                                                                
15 Guy Stessens, Money Laundering: A New International Law Enforcement Model  (CUP, 2000) 
16 Ian Ross, Exposing Fraud: Skills, Process and Practicalities (John Wiley & Sons, 2015) 19 
17 Note that the laundering process is separate from the action of committing that offence that produce 
the proceeds of crime. 
18 Sideek Mohamed, ‘Legal Instrument to Combat Money laundering in the EU Financial Market’ 
[2002] 6(1) JMLC 66 
19 Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti-Money Laundering (John Wiley & Sons, 2014)  
20 Heba Shams, Legal Globalization: Money Laundering Law and Other Cases (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law 2004) 
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their proceeds.21 Therefore, international corporation is highly sought for in international crimes. The 
principle of dual criminality has been adopted in terms of giving law enforcement authorities 
extraterritorial effect on the prosecutions of money laundering.22 There are however limitations in the 
principle which may sabotage the likelihood of success in a money laundering prosecution. Hence, this 
article will also assess the existing principles surrounding extradition in money laundering to counter 
crimes that are not relevant organised crime group.  
 This article will be split into 4 sections. Firstly, a brief background information surrounding the 
concept of corporate finance crime and legal concept of money laundering itself. Secondly, the 
discussions will proceed to the issue with predicate offence and at the same time discussing how it will 
affect corporate finance crime. Thirdly, the discussion on extradition and the legal issue dealt on dual 
criminality extradition in money laundering will be discussed. Finally, finished with a conclusion of what 
has been discussed in the afore sections.  
 
A. Brief Background  
Statistical findings on corporate financial crime committed  
 Looking at the Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018, it was recorded that out of 7500 
respondents that participated the survey, 49% of the respondents of global organisations experience 
economic crime in the past two years.23 64% of respondents reported that financial losses was due 
directly from most disruptive fraud could rise to US$1million.24 This means 4800 respondent experience 
                                                                
21 Bala Shanmugam, Mahendhiran Nair, and R. Sugathi, ‘Money Laundering in Malaysia’ [2003] 6(4) 
JMLC 373 
22 Dennis Cox, Handbook of Anti-Money Laundering (John Wiley & Sons, 2014)  
 
23 PWC, ‘Pulling fraud out of the shadows; Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018’ [2018]  
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html> accessed 25 
July 2019 
24 PWC, ‘Pulling fraud out of the shadows; Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018’ [2018]  
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loss from disruptive fraud which in turn totalled to US$4.8 billion losses on the global economy. Not to 
mentioned that 7500 respondents of global organisations is a fraction of the existing companies in the 
world. Table 1 indicates the type of corporate crimes suffered by companies in UK and Malaysia over 
the past 2 years (2017- 2018).  
 
 
Table 1. The Crime Types suffered by companies  
 UK Malaysia 
Cybercrime 42% 48% 
Bribery & corruption 6% 35% 
Money laundering  7% - 
Business misconduct  21% 45% 
Asset misappropriation 49% 41% 
Source: PwC Global Economic Crime Survey 2018: Malaysia and UK Findings 25 
 
Between the two countries, it is apparent that Malaysia companies experienced higher rate by 
in all categories of corporate crime compared to UK companies by 8.8%.26 It was also reported that 
                                                                
<https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/advisory/forensics/economic-crime-survey.html> accessed 25 
July 2019 
25 PWC, ‘Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018: Malaysia Report’ [2018]  
 < https://www.pwc.com/my/en/publications/2018-gecfs-malaysia.html> accessed 25 July 2019 
26 This figure was calculated by the difference between the average corporate crime rate between UK 
and Malaysia 
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Malaysia suffered an all-time high in fraud rates, with 41% Malaysian companies indicating that 
economic crime was experienced in the last two years.27   
 
In comparison to UK sector, the survey indicates a fall in the overall level of UK businesses 
experiencing fraud from 55% in 2016 to 50% in 2018.28 Of course, from the figures given, the most 
popular method being asset misappropriation (or asset theft)29 with 49% and this figure is relatively 
higher than what was reported by Malaysia. Regardless, this is seen as one of the popular crimes 
adopted by offenders in both UK and Malaysia. The other popular crime being cybercrime and followed 
by business misconduct. 
 
It is interesting to see that in terms of money laundering; Malaysia did not provide any figures 
as compared to UK which comes under 7%. Nonetheless, the bribery and corruption rates of Malaysia 
is at 35%, higher than UK by 29%. It cannot be guarantee that money laundering is not committed by 
corporations in Malaysia and it would be illogical to do so. Regardless there are still money laundering 
cases reported by30 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM)31 and currently an ongoing kleptocracy case, the 
1MDB scandal. Under this 1MDB scandal, in 2015, former prime minister of Malaysia, Najib Razak was 
accused of transferring over RM2.6 billion (nearly USD 700 million) from a government-run strategic 
                                                                
27 PWC, ‘Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018: Malaysia Report’ [2018]  
 < https://www.pwc.com/my/en/publications/2018-gecfs-malaysia.html> accessed 25 July 2019 
28 PWC, ‘Global Economic Crime and Fraud Survey 2018: UK Findings’ [2018]  
<https://www.pwc.co.uk/services/forensic-services/insights/global-economic-crime-survey-2018---uk-
findings.html> accessed 25 July 2019 
29 Asset misappropriation defined as theft of assets. This includes embezzlement and deception by 
employees, or the theft of company property or assets by outsiders  
30 50% of the cases found under BNM are charged under the Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism 
Financing Act 2001 (AMLATFA) 
31 Normah Omar, Roshima Said, Zulaikha ‘Amirah Johari ‘Corporate crimes in Malaysia: a profile 
analysis’ (Journal of Financial Crime, 3 May 2016) 
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development company, 1Malaysia Development Berhad, into his own personal bank accounts. He is 
consecutively charged under 42 counts; 5 counts on corruption, 28 counts consist of money laundering 
offence and 9 counts on criminal breach of trusts.32  
   
With the current ongoing scandal taking place, it is factual to state that a lack of moral authority 
at the top of local government system will disrupt a legitimate public and private sector. Public offices 
are diligently utilised to further private business deals and private gains at the expense of the public 
good. Consequently, it is no surprise to witness political meddling in high corruption cases and this is 
reflected well in the corruption and bribery rates indicated in Table 1. As there are no effective policies 
to counter briberies, it would mean that the vicious cycle of money laundering in a country will be 
limitless. 
 
Arguably, money launderers are able to prosper in developing countries because of the 
attractiveness of bribes are difficult for those that are poorly paid or ‘intimidated’ government officials 
employed to administer the implementation of anti-money laundering framework to resist.33 Hence, they 
are equipped with boundless access routes to integrate illicit proceeds into the system. 34  All the 
loopholes have been explored and devised into the offender’s strategies before integrating illicit funds 
into the legitimate financial system. Hence, it is in corrupt environment where offenders are able to 
manipulate the system easier and corruption rate are at its highest in most developing countries. 
 
                                                                
32 The Straits Times, ‘A long list of charges against Najib as 1MDB trial kicks off on Tuesday’ (The 
Straits Times, 11 February 2019) < https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/a-long-list-of-charges-
against-najib-as-1mdb-trial-kicks-off-on-tuesday> accessed 24 July 2019 
33 Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 
Countries (Ashgate, 2012) 150 
34 Norman Mugarura, The Global Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed 




What is corporate financial crime? 
 Financial crime is conversely to the term “white-collar crime” which is defined as ‘a crime 
committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation’.35 The 
origin of the term “white-collar crime” was introduced by Professor Edwin Sutherland in his 1939 
presidential lecture to the American Sociological Society.36 And within the confinements of his findings, 
he concluded that financial crime is committed mostly by “merchant princes and captains of finance and 
industry’ while working for a wide range of corporations including those involved in ‘railways, insurance, 
munitions, banking, public utilities, stock, exchanges, the oil industry and real estate’.37  
 
 The discussions on the definition regardless has always been concentrated on crimes 
committed by individuals who are either a representative or agent, or an employee of a corporation and 
very few have considered corporate financial crime can be committed by corporations.38 Oddly enough, 
this comes to no surprise because there was a common belief that only individuals are able to commit 
crimes.39 Nonetheless, under common law, it is provided that corporations are able to commit a crime.40 
  
                                                                
35 E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden: New York, NY, 1949) 9 
36 E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden: New York, NY, 1949) 9 
37 E. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (Dryden: New York, NY, 1949) 9 
38 Roland Hefendehi, ‘Addressing White Collar Crime on a Domestic Level’ [201] 8(3) J Intl Criminal 
Justice 769 
39 Roland Hefendehi, ‘Addressing White Collar Crime on a Domestic Level’ [201] 8(3) J Intl Criminal 
Justice 769 
40 Nicholas Ryder, “Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail?” A critical and comparative 
analysis of enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the USA and the UK” 
[2018] 82(3) J. Crim.L. 245 
 12 
 A corporation is defined as ‘an incorporate body with separate legal entity which is 
distinguishable from the creators of the company’.41 By having a legal entity that is separate from the 
individuals who create and manage them, they can be considered as ‘legal persons’ in their own right 
through the means of incorporation.42 This also includes both public and private limited companies. 
Hence, certain offences can be committed by a corporation. This offences can be money laundering 
offences, tax evasion, bribery and corruption and fraud. And those crimes are mostly committed by 
large international business. In the UK, corporations are found to be liable under the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, the creation of the failure to prevent bribery offences 
under the Bribery Act 201043 
 
 Prior to the enactment of Bribery Act 2010, the English system has taken a significant departure 
from the long standing common law rule on corporate liability principle for offences requiring one to 
prove the mental element, the identification principle.44 This departure consequently would move us 
one step closer to the ‘respondent superior approach’ that is originated from the federal courts in the 
US Commercial organisations.45 In effect, the application is similar to a strict liability under the Bribery 
Act 2010 and Criminal Justice Act 2017.46  
 
                                                                
41 Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary 12 Ed.  
42 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22  
43 Nicholas Ryder, “Too scared to prosecute and too scared to jail?” A critical and comparative 
analysis of enforcement of financial crime legislation against corporations in the USA and the UK” 
[2018] 82(3) J. Crim.L. 245 
44 David Corker, Corker Binning, ‘Why reform of corporate criminal liability is necessary and the best 
means of achieving it’ (Lexology, 16 March 2017) < 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ce953138-f7d1-4ed8-9b52-b150377ce223> accessed 
26 August 2019 
45 Celia Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime- a proposal’ [2017] 6 Crim L.R. 426 
46 Celia Wells, ‘Corporate failure to prevent economic crime- a proposal’ [2017] 6 Crim L.R. 426 
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Bribery  
Section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010 imposes a strict liability on corporate that fails to prevent an act of 
bribery.47The corporate will be exempted from rule if it can demonstrate that it has adequate procedures 
to prevent the offences from occurring. So far, this has been successful in changing the company 
behaviour, with evidences stating that compliance is taken seriously. This model was subsequently 
transferred to other areas of corporate financial crime; such as the new corporate tax offences relating 
to the failure to prevent UK and foreign tax evasion.48 Furthermore, it also inspired the Ministry of Justice 
to issue a consultation paper “Call for Evidence on Corporate Liability for Economic Crime”, with 
particular reference to create further impositions on corporate’s “failure to prevent” fraud, false 
accounting and money laundering offences.49  
 
 
Tax evasion  
Just recently in the year 2017, The Criminal Finances Act 2017 was enacted and was aimed at 
expanding existing provisions in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.50  Amongst the amendments made, 
one of which has to deal with imposing criminal liability on UK and non-UK company that failed to 
prevent the facilitation of tax evasion by an ‘associated person’.51 This includes UK and foreign tax 
                                                                
47 Bribery Act 2010, s7 
48 S.F. Copp and A. Cronin, ‘New models of corporate criminality: the development and relative 
effectiveness of “failure to prevent” offences’ [2018] 39(4)Comp. Law. 104 
49 S.F. Copp and A. Cronin, ‘New models of corporate criminality: the development and relative 
effectiveness of “failure to prevent” offences’ [2018] 39(4)Comp. Law. 104 
50 S.F. Copp and A. Cronin, ‘New models of corporate criminality: the development and relative 
effectiveness of “failure to prevent” offences’ [2018] 39(4)Comp. Law. 104 
51 Ashurst, ‘Corporate criminal offences for failure to prevent facilitation of tax evasion’ (ashust, 7 July 
2017)  
<https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights/legal-updates/corporate-criminal-offences-for-failure-
to-prevent-facilitation-of-tax-evasion/> accessed  27 August 2019 
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evasion.  An ‘associated person’ is broadly defined to include ‘any person (or entity) that provides a 
service for the business or on its behalf’.52 Hence, foreign tax adviser, offshore accountancy firm, 
broker, trustee or company director constitutes to an ‘associated person’. Here are some instances 
which would fall under the new offence; a) a non-UK company will be liable under the offence if the 
overseas employee from its London branch commits a foreign tax evasion facilitation for an overseas 
client,53 b) a foreign tax advisor will be considered as an ‘associated person’ if the UK firm supervise 
the ongoing relationship between the client and the advice sought, in which the UK firm delivers the 
advice to the client and in return pay the adviser’s fees.54 And c) where a UK manufacturing company 
create a false accounting scheme with the help of the customer and consequently enabling the 
customer to evade UK taxes.55 This in effect will lead the manufacturing company liable. 
 
Money laundering  
To put this in simple terms, money laundering refers to ‘financial transaction scheme which aims to 
conceal the identity, source, and destination of illicitly-obtained money’.56 The empirical study of the 
money laundering phenomenon first started between the 1970s and 1980s where ‘some suspected 
criminals, especially wholesome drug dealers, were becoming rich and flaunting the trappings of 
wealth without being subject to the criminal law’.57 It found that there was inefficacy to bring 
prosecutions due to the insufficient evidence. Even if the prosecutions were successful, suspicion 
                                                                
52 Criminal Finances Act 2017, s44(4)  
53 Allen & Overy, ‘New corporate criminal tax evasion offence’ [2016] 27(5) PLC Mag. 65  
54 Allen & Overy, ‘New corporate criminal tax evasion offence’ [2016] 27(5) PLC Mag. 65 
55 Allen & Overy, ‘New corporate criminal tax evasion offence’ [2016] 27(5) PLC Mag. 65  
56 Brigitte Unger, Daan van der Linde, Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2013)  
57 Peter Aldridge, ‘Money Laundering and Globalization’ [2008] 35 J.L. & SOCY437, 440 
 15 
remained that the profits had been hidden so that the prisoners could enjoy their profits after being 
released.58 
 
Stages of money laundering 
The simplest way of understanding the process involved is placing the scheme into three stages; 
placement, layering and integration. Placement stage is where the illicit funds will be introduced into 
the financial system for the first time. One method used in this stage is ‘smurfing’.59 This involves a 
small group of individuals who will deposit cash sums that are below the reporting threshold. 
 
The second stage involves layering where the purpose of this stage is to complicate the money trail 
and make it harder to uncover the laundering activity.60 Layering stage is initiated by having numerous 
transactions to disguise the origin of the illicit funds.61 For example, over-invoicing, false paper trail and 
the cash purchase of tangible assets and later converted to counter the transaction cost and cash 
conversion to other money instrument such as traveller’s cheques or letters of credit. 62 
 
Lastly, the final stage is integration stage. The illicit funds are this stage are safely placed and layered 
to the extent that the launderer can access the funds through a legitimate financial system.63 For 
instance, this stage is conducted by real estate transaction where property is bought by shell 
                                                                
58 Peter Aldridge, ‘Money Laundering and Globalization’ [2008] 35 J.L. & SOCY437, 440 
59 John Madinger, Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigations (3rd edn, CRC Press 2011)  
60 John Madinger, Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigations (3rd edn, CRC Press 2011)  
61 John Madinger, Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigations (3rd edn, CRC Press 2011) 
62 Mary Michelle Gallant, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime; Economic Crime and Civil 
Remedies (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005)  
63 John Madinger, Money Laundering: A Guide For Criminal Investigations (3rd edn, CRC Press 2011) 
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corporations using illicit proceeds.64 Property  will be sold and proceeds appeal as legitimate sales 
proceeds. Another sample would be using front companies and sham loans.65 The launderer can pay 
his or her foreign laundering subsidiary interests on the loan and deduct it as a business expense, 
thereby reducing his or her tax liability.66 Another example and frequently found in case studies is the 
use of foreign bank complicity.67   
 
This 3-stage process is what many considered to be the traditional approach to the process of money 
laundering because it primarily concerns on the activities involved. Nowadays, it is rather much more 
complicated, and it would provide misguidance to depend wholly on a cumulation of elements set in the 
process. It is even possible for money to be laundered without the need to apply the 3-stage process. 
 
Legal Definition of Money Laundering  
There are many legal definitions offered by different jurisdictions. With each having slight variations to 
their understanding and concept of money laundering, the FATF seeks to define ‘money laundering’ in 
the aims of setting a standard for soft unification and centralisation in the enforcement and regulatory 
framework. The term was described as ‘the processing of these criminal proceeds to disguise their 
illegal origin’.68  
 
                                                                
64 Mary Michelle Gallant, Money Laundering and the Proceeds of Crime; Economic Crime and Civil 
Remedies (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005)  
65 Ernesto Savona, Responding to Money Laundering (Routledge, 2005)  
66 Ernesto Savona, Responding to Money Laundering (Routledge, 2005)  
67 Mark Kehoe, ‘The Threat of Money Laundering’ 
<https://www.tcd.ie/Economics/assets/pdf/SER/1996/Mark_Kehoe.html> accessed 22 August 2019 
68 Financial Action Task Force,  < https://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/>  
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In the UK, money laundering is defined as ‘the process by which the proceeds of crime are converted 
into assets which appear to have a legitimate origin, so that they can be retained permanently or 
recycled into further criminal enterprises.’69 The offence of money laundering, which is found Proceeds 
of Crime Act 2002, includes to:  
  
(a) Conceal, disguise, convert, transfer or remove criminal property from the UK,70 
(b) Become concerned in an arrangement which a person knows, or suspects facilitates the 
use of control of criminal property,71 
(c) Acquire, use of have possession of criminal property72 
 
 
Pre-requisites of money laundering offence 
In all the three offences described above, there are pre-requisites that needs to be considered.  
“Criminal conduct” means any conduct which constitutes as an offence in UK. It also covers conduct 
that is committed abroad which would also constitute to an offence had it been occurred in the UK.73 
Further discussions on criminal conduct will be found in Part D of this article. 
 
“Criminal Property” as defined in s340 of the Proceeds of Crime Act constitutes to a person’s benefit 
from a criminal conduct.74The UK regulatory framework merely defines criminal conduct as ‘all conduct 
                                                                
69 The Explanatory Notes to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA2002) 
70 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s327 
71 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s328 
72 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, s329 
73 Peter Reuter, Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering (Peter Reuter, 2005)  
74 Legal Guidance, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part 7-Money Laundering Offences  
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which constitutes an offence in any part of the United Kingdom’. This means an “all crimes” is adopted 
in respect of predicate crimes committed in the UK.75 Some countries preferred the approach of listing 
predicate crimes similar to Malaysia.76 
 
B. Predicate offence of Money Laundering regime   
Money Laundering convictions has never been smooth sailing due to the empirical complications 
involved. Money laundering cases tend to be extensive, resource hungry and are prone to risk of failure 
at point of conviction in the courts as shown in the past.  
 
The main obstruction lies in establishing the validity of whether the property in question is criminal in 
origin and whether the offender knows or suspects that the money is criminal in origin. To prove the 
former, it is observed that many jurisdictions would set a pre-requisite in establishing a defined crime 
                                                                
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/proceeds-crime-act-2002-part-7-money-laundering-offences> 
accessed 25 July 2019 
75 Legal Guidance, Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 Part 7-Money Laundering Offences  
<https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/proceeds-crime-act-2002-part-7-money-laundering-offences> 
accessed 25 July 2019 
76 Similar to UK, overarching emphasis in Malaysian anti-money laundering regulatory framework is the 
money, asset concerned or deemed to be proceeds of money laundering must first of all be a proceeds 
of an unlawful activity. Proceeds of unlawful activity means property from any activity that constitutes 
to any serious offence or any foreign serious offence, or any activity which bears the nature or causes 
the results to be a commission of any serious offence or any foreign serious offence. ‘Serious offence’ 
comprises of a non-exhaustive list almost 290 offences, as described in the Second Schedule of 
AMLATFA 2002, that falls under more than 40 statutes that ranges from Penal Code, Dangerous Drugs 
Act, Kidnapping Act, Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling or Migrants Act, Companies Act, 
Insurance Act, Securities Industry Act and Banking and Financial Institutions Act. The range of offences 
covered as serious offence under AMLATFA even covers the proceeds from copyright infringement; 
failure to submit income tax returns; operating an unregistered timber business; carrying on a money 
changing; money lending or pawnbroking business without license; and giving false trade descriptions. 
Both UK and Malaysia have similar anti-money laundering regulatory framework, with definitions 
defined in the widest of terms possible to broaden the chances for a successful conviction.  
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or type of crime (predicate offence) prior to proving the latter (which involved the mens rea of the 
offence). By having this condition, it assumes all proceeds that are laundered derives from another 
crime such as drug trafficking, gambling, or theft. Hence, the criminality would be proven by reference 
to circumstantial evidence such as audit trail, 77  lack of legitimate income to account for amounts 
transferred and the obvious indication to the predicate offence such as drug-contaminated notes.78 This 
of course does not necessarily reflect the sophistication and complication behind a money laundering 
operation. This approach may be too simplistic and rigid for prosecutors to follow up.79 In most major 
organised crime groups, who are resource abundant and capable of wherewithal to distance 
themselves from criminal activity that has generated their wealth, they would not utilise the normal 
approach of starting with predicate offence and only later the money laundering process.80 Most often, 
they would begin with the actual laundering process itself, in which the way money is handled.81 The 
entry point of the investigation in such instance, would occurred sometime after the predicate offence, 
usually in an outside region away from where the predicate offence was originally committed82 and, in 
a manner, where it is almost impossible to establish a direct linkage between the proceed and the 
predicate offence. 83  Without properly considering this aspect, it would cause a low series of 
investigatory activity, by virtue of the persistent discouragement from the failure to prove cases that are 
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known to be untried and difficult.84 How would one proceed with the convictions then?  There is little 
unanimity towards what the circumstantial evidence are in this case.  
 
B1 Development of the case law.  
The first encounter with the issue was mentioned in the case of El Kurd85. The courts were confronted 
with this problem when it was impossible to identify a particular crime or class of crime which generated 
the proceeds in question. In the judgement given by Latham LJ, “it expressed [the court’s] concern that 
Parliament has created this dichotomy with the attendant difficulties which this case exemplifies.” The 
only solution as the courts found fit was to charge one compendious count of conspiracy.86 ‘Conspiracy’ 
will be further discussed later on under the mental element. 
 
At that time when the case was decided, there was two different statutory regimes which deals with 
different proceeds. The Criminal Justice (International Co-operation) Act 1990 repealed and re-enacted 
in the Drug Trafficking Act dealt with the proceeds of drug trafficking.87 The other, Criminal Justice Act 
1993, dealt with proceeds relating to all other crimes.88 In consideration with the Courts’ criticism, the 
Parliament addressed the issue with merging all proceeds into one statutory regime and consequently 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 was established.89 The enactment was supported with much hope for 
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the future prosecutions. In the case of Singh (Rana),90 Auld LJ, the leading judge of the case bespoke 
the provisional interpretation in Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 as follows: 
 
“The new offence is one of dealing with various forms in ‘criminal property’ namely property constituting 
a benefit from or representing such a benefit, from ‘criminal conduct’, defined in the broadest terms in 
section 340 as “conduct which constitutes an offence in any part of the United Kingdom”.91 
 
In short, regardless of whether the property is derived from the offender’s own crime or from crimes 
committed by other, the property is deemed criminal as long as the offender holds a condescending 
interest over it. 92  So, proceeds from the laundering activities perform by someone else, such as 
professional launderers on behalf of the authors of the underlying offences is just as much liable as the 
principal offender of the money laundering offence. 
 
He further suggests that there will no longer be a scope for such an issue of dichotomy of offence in 
the realm of a money laundering offence since it has been removed by the creation of Part 7 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.93 The emergence of a new statutory offence of money laundering has in 
effect repealed the substantive offences under the 1994 and the 1998 Act.94 
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Fast forward to 3 years, the House of Lord in the case of Montilla95 considered the argument proposed 
by Auld LJ. The judgement held that in both substantive offences under the s932C (2) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1988 and s49(2) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, the prosecution must prove the property 
in question was in fact proceeds of criminal conduct and drug trafficking respectively. 96 The ratio 
decidendi however, was somewhat misleading. The courts did not suggest that the prosecution must 
prove that the cash that was exchanged by the defendants into Dutch guilders came from any particular 
offence or offences, or even a type of offence.  Based on the facts, the cash proceeds are derived from 
criminal conduct and not drug trafficking. Therefore, s93C(2) Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies. As 
such, there is no mandatory requirement to prove a property in question is derived from any particular 
offence or type of offence.97 
 
Rather than clarifying the issue, it has deepened the issue. This would inherently indicate that 
prosecution no longer has to deal with just the difficulty in proving a predicate offence, but they also 
have to consider whether it is required to prove the criminal property derived from a particular type of 
offence, predicate offence. The following cases, Craig98 and R v NW99 was decided by the same group 
of judges in the Court of Appeal. Nonetheless, the ratio given was inconsistent. Both offenders were 
convicted with the offence of money laundering under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (s327 
and s328). 100 Nonetheless, each case was decided differently. 
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In the case of Craig,101 it was concluded by the jury that there was an overwhelming inference that Mr 
Craig’s funds were derived from criminal activity. There was no effort made to identify criminal conduct 
in question due to high level of drug contamination on some of the cash found. Hence, it can be indicated 
that the proceeds come from drug dealing. 102 
The Crown presented a view in which the statutory definition of criminal property did not specify as to 
means used to turn the property into ‘criminal property’.103 All that it was merely indicating the broad 
spectrum of criminal conduct can be considered.104 There was no specific identification or indication of 
a crime has generated criminal property.105 
Although the appeal was allowed on other grounds, it is worth to note that the upon considering the 
Crown’s argument, the Court of Appeal considered a decision by Butterfield J. in regard to the definition 
of criminal conduct in s34 of POCA. He stated that ‘there was nothing in the wording which imports any 
requirement that the prosecution prove that the property emanated from a particular crime or a specific 
type of criminal conduct.’106  
This helpful development in the case law was not sustained in the further case and was replaced by 
the R v NW.107  In the case of R v NW,108 there was an issue in regard of the admissibility of evidence. 
The evidence in which the Crown has relied on to demonstrate the situs of money was excluded by the 
judge. Th Crown proceeded and invited the jury to infer from the circumstances that the proceeds was 
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of ‘criminal property’.109 The Crown proceeded but was abruptly stopped by the judge. It was later 
concluded by the Court of Appeal that the prosecution must prove at least the class of criminal conduct 
that the criminal property was derived from.110 This perfectly sums up the ability crime group has in 
exploiting the complexity behind the modus operandi and had effectively confused the jury in terms of 
understanding the operation.111  
Comparing the two cases, the decision made in R v NW112 had definitely the prevailing status over 
Craig113 since the decision in the latter case was obiter dicta. Hence, the developments to an ‘irresistible 
inference’ test was retracted further.  
In R v Anwoir114, the court has made developments to clarify the law on this matter. In Anwoir,115 the 
appellants had been convicted of free-standing money laundering arrangement offences contrary to 
s328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The mode used to launder large sums of cash was by bureaux 
de change with of course help from those whom have agreed to launder the money.116 Additionally, the 
source of monies derived from drug trafficking and carousel fraud, also known as VAT fraud. 117  
Essentially, carousel fraud consists of commodities such as mobile phones, are actually or notionally 
imported into the UK and later exported in order to obtain VAT repayments without having to account 
for the VAT itself. The imported goods are then sold through a series of companies that will be liable to 
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VAT, before being exported or possibly back to the original seller.118 The first link in the chain will 
normally go missing without accounting for VAT and the final link in the chain will reclaim the VAT it has 
paid from National Treasury prior to disappearing.119 Hence, the point of investigatory process begins 
at the layering stage where there have been numerous transactions prior to disguise the true origin of 
the money.  
Hence, it is difficult to find direct evidence from which the jury could infer that some of the proceeds 
may come from drug trafficking and some from VAT fraud.120 Nonetheless, prosecution could clearly 
make an inference from the fact that the appellant was willing to contribute in the laundering of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking, as evidence from the way he had describe his dealings during tape-
recorded conversations.121 Also, another factor that can be taken in as an inference to the offence was 
the past criminal records the appellants had with drug offences. Even though the quantity of drugs were 
of small quantity, the evidence taken as a whole would justify the inference. 
The NW122 case was distinguished, with particular emphasis on the facts produced between the two 
cases; Anwoir123 and NW124. The court stated, ‘NW was a case in which the prosecution’s evidence 
was essentially based upon the fact that NW had no visible means of support …’.125 In support to the 
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judgement in Anwoir126, the court in the case of Ahmed127 states that the the facts in NW128 did not have 
visible means of support as principle evidence to support the relevant funds were criminal. Therefore, 
the Court of Appeal stated:  
‘We consider that in the present case the Crown are correct in their submission that there are two ways 
in which the Crown can prove the property derives from crime a) by showing that it derives from conduct 
of a specific kind or kinds and that conduct of that kind or those kinds is unlawful, or b) by evidence of 
the circumstances in which the property is handled which are such as to give rise to the irresistible 
inference that it can only be derived from the crime.’129 
Essentially, the court affirmed the decisions in El Kurd130and Craig.131  Immediately after, judgement 
was followed by in the case of R v F&B132 where prosecution did not give any indication of the type or 
class of predicate offence the monies in question was derived.133 
 Upon closer inspection, the encompassing rule of establishing the predicate crime to the proceeds of 
money laundering was not eradicated. Only where it is necessary to acquire an inference, the 
prosecution can infer from a circumstance that the property in question derived from a criminal 
conduct.134 Even so, money laundering prosecutions can be advanced with sufficient circumstantial 
evidence to provide an irresistible inference that the money in question is criminal. 
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So far, with reference to recent case of R v Otegbola,135  one can discern from the fact that the 
‘irresistible inference’ test has been applied skilfully and effectively. The facts represent a classic case 
of money laundering where there was no legitimate reason for large sums of money to be paid out of 
the accounts.136 The only reasonable explanation behind this it can only be derived from crime, on the 
manner in which the funds had been moved between the accounts. 137  There was no evidence 
suggesting that the offenders registered for money service business and all gave different explanations 
on the relevant transactions. Hence, prosecution was able to show that the monies in question was 
transferred between accounts controlled by the co-accused. In effect, the appeal against conviction in 
a money laundering was dismissed by the court where the jury was able to infer that the money could 
only have been derived from crime. 
 
B.2 Findings  
 A much compromising approach in the judicial interpretation has been adopted by the English courts 
when it comes to proving that the property is a criminal property. Traditionally, the use of ‘predicate 
offence’ was never the creation of UK legislatives but borrowed from US legislation, thus there was no 
part of the POCA legislation.138  The invocation for the predicate offence requirement was from a 
common belief at the time that without a predicate offence there was little prospect of obtaining a money 
laundering conviction, and as a consequence to develop such cases did not get past first base.139 When 
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money laundering was first expressed in the 1980s, it was generated by drug offences and other 
offences which are bound to specific criterion of seriousness.140 The consequence was laundering was 
originally regarded as a form of complicity to other serious offence by the courts in England and Wales. 
The standard account of complicity at common law holds the degree of culpability of the accomplice is 
limited by the offence of principal. 141 
 
Regardless, the popularity of predicate offence remains as the exclusive route for legal circles, although 
it is at odds with what is possible by reference to the statute and the relevant case law.142 Hence, 
predicate offence still has an adverse influence in the early stage and in effect the money laundering 
provisions of POCA are still not fully exploited.143 This does not, however, propel advantages to law 
enforcement authorities. The contradiction between an idealistic approach to a practical approach 
towards proving criminality has in effect cause uncertainty within law enforcement as what is required 
in money laundering conviction.144 The uncertainty deepens with what type of evidence is needed to 
make an inference of criminality irresistible. Ultimately, there is still room for development through case 
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law intervention, but it may not be able to generate fast enough to keep up with the operational 
advancement in money laundering process.145  
Hence, the main challenge, as observed in the cases mentioned above, is the use of evidence 
to build necessary irresistible inference. Predominantly in most money laundering schemes, fund 
transfers are often concealed as loans. This essentially equates to fraud.146 Fake loan agreements are 
drawn up and the common feature of these loans are they are never likely to repaid. The loan agreement 
is made to a corporate entity which transfers the money to its set location and then file for a formal 
insolvency arrangement.147 Of course, along with the insolvency arrangement set comes with the 
pending debts still owed to the accomplice entity.148 The liquidator or administrator will experience 
hostility to be contacted from the part of the owner which has the largest creditor balance on the 
statement of affairs, a reticence which in a normal commercial environment would be somewhat 
unusual and questionable.149 
Another instance is where funds are dissected through corporate acquisition.150 The other common 
feature is the hidden agreement and teamwork of two parties to the transaction whose desire will be 
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that it is viewed by the outside world as an arm’s length transaction.151 The reality is set when the 
distribution of the proceeds post-completion is analysed- which may for instance, disclose that the 
supposed purchaser of the corporate vehicle using funds borrowed from a legitimate lender is the 
ultimate recipient of the acquisition funds which are channelled to him via the acquired company’s 
solicitors.152 
 
These are essentially all clear evidential signals of illegitimate fund; false invoice, false loan 
agreements, the circumstances of a transferee company’s demise, the apparent disappearance of a 
major creditor in a liquidation, the use of corporate acquisition transactions to release criminal value 
tied up corporate vehicles in combination. The essential characteristic of the accumulated evidence-
and what will give it persuasive power in the court room- is that it all points to the same direction.153  
Over time, the will to collect such evidence will be more readily and efficiently accepted as a valid and 
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B.3.Proving mental element: suspicion and knowledge 
Whilst the victory remains that prosecution is not required to prove a class or type of crime in money 
laundering offence, the courts in R v Geary155 raised another pivotal question on the matter of time 
relevance in the mental element of the offender. The issue was when should the offender knows and 
suspects that the property in question was criminal? Without considering this condition, it could ‘stretch 
the language of the section beyond its proper limits’.156 Hence, it was decided by the court that the 
property can be criminal when the offender knows or suspects at the time when the property was 
handed over to them. Property cannot be criminal just by the result of the action in carrying out the 
arrangement.157  
This additionally raised another issue for prosecution to consider when the ‘irresistible 
inference’ test is used. The main emphasis is on the act itself and not the actual material fact that the 
make the property a ‘criminal property’.158 In effect, this would cause a lacuna in the law whereby an 
exception to the irresistible inference test can be formed.159Where the property was handled after the 
offender knew or suspects that the property derived from illicit activities, the property in question would 
not be considered as criminal. In that statement, it could propel an offender to evade prosecution since 
it has failed the mental element of proving that he knows or suspects the property was criminal at the 
time property was handled over to him.160  
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Hence, an accomplice to a fraudster who has agreed to lend their bank account at the disposal 
of the fraudster will not be committing an offence of money laundering because all the accomplice has 
to do is deny the fact that he knew or suspects that the money was criminal at the time it was transferred 
into their bank account.  
Essentially, the Supreme Court in R v GH161 seeks to address this issue. The main issue was 
whether or not the victims’ money first acquired its criminal character through the arrangement itself.  
At first instance, the Court of Appeal took it upon agreement that the case should be decided in 
accordance to Geary where the property in question was not criminal property within the meaning of 
section 340 POCA 2002.162 This is by virtue that the B’s victim had paid the money into H’s account 
directly. 163 
In the case of Geary,164 the emphasis and the focus point should be on the fact that the monies 
received into the bank account were from a legitimate source. Harrington was seeking to defraud his 
wife and pervert the course of justice by transferring some of his money out of the reach of his divorce 
settlement.165 The money obtained its characterisation as criminal property due to the arrangement 
itself being carried out. In this circumstance, it was the arrangement itself which rendered the monies 
criminal property, and this was fatal to a charge under section 328(1) POCA 2002.166  
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A conspiracy167 to money laundering could of course be charged but this would require the 
Crown to prove knowledge on the part of the Defendant that the money was criminal property.168 
Furthermore, the statutory conspiracy charge in section 328 Proceeds of Crime Act 169  contains 
numerous ambiguity which consequently makes it difficult to rely on.170 Specifically, with reference to 
Section 1(2) Criminal Law Act 1977171which holds the overarching provision on ‘conspiracy’. The 
problem stems from its technical nature since the wording of the section is ‘obscure’172 thus making it 
difficult to understand. Furthermore, the interpretation part exposes an even more fundamental 
problem, the true purpose of the conspiracy offence seems to be disorientated.173 Although the Law 
Commission made recommendation to amend the provision in their Report Number 318, the effect and 
proposals made were seen to be overtly controversial and was consequently rejected.174  
By contrast, proof of mere suspicion is enough for the substantive money laundering 
offences.175 The main authority for suspicion is not defined in POCA but in the case of Da Silva.176 The 
court in the subsequent case stated that suspicion is formed where it is found to have a possibility, 
which is more than fanciful that the other person was or had been engaged in, or benefited from criminal 
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conduct.177 This was far less difficult to prove and offers much more sensible standard to the offence of 
money laundering. 
It felt that applying higher standard in the mental element could not have been the intention of 
Parliament when the present money laundering offences were enacted as part of the POCA 2002. On 
the basis the Crown persuaded the COA to certify a point of law of general public importance on which 
the SC gave leave to appeal.178 
The Supreme Court, differing its judgement from the Court of Appeal, distinguished Geary.179 Lord 
Toulson said the following:  
 
“it was not the case of a defendant holding the proceeds originating from a crime independent of the 
arrangement made between them. It was Harrington’s lawfully owned property when it was paid to the 
defendant… it bore no criminal taint apart from the arrangement made between them. The fact that the 
arrangement involved a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice did not mean that the money had a 
criminal quality independent of the arrangement”180 
 
He further stated that, “the present case is different. The character of the money did change on 
being paid into the respondent’s accounts. The property was lawful property in the hands of the victims 
at the moment when they paid it into the respondent’s accounts. It became criminal property in the 
hands of B, not by reason of the arrangement made between B and the respondent but by reason of 
the fact that it was obtained through fraud perpetrated on the victims. I do not see it as illegitimate to 
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regard the respondent as participating in an arrangement to retain criminal property for the benefit of 
another.”181 
Essentially, the Supreme Court has condensed the pivotal ingredient of actus reus and mens 
rea into one as being read as ‘an arrangement which he knows or suspects will facilitate’ in recognising 
the current wording of s328 with the aid of description found in money laundering in the explanatory 
notes to the article para 6).182 Although it may conjure criticisms, but in this circumstance, it is not 
sensible to interpret it as two separate components.183 
This is because nowadays, the overarching practicality behind fraudulent activities have shifted. 
Whilst it is recognisable that a fraudulent activity is a common feature of money laundering schemes, 
the practical result behind fraudulent activity goes beyond mere deception, or false pretence. Instead, 
the practical result of fraud is to proceed onto the laundering process. Hence, the distinction made will 
likely stop prosecution as a fraudulent act on its own in a money laundering scheme. 184 
In a deception prosecution, some form of action is required on the part of a victim which he 
would not have otherwise undertaken and as such resulted to his loss. This is represented into the 
Fraud Act of England and Wales where the elements necessary to the offence are a false representation 
made dishonestly knowing that the representation might be untrue or misleading with intent to make 
gain for himself or another, to cause loss or to expose another risk of loss. 185 
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Nonetheless, a deception with the aim to further the laundering process, does not conspire one 
of the parties to the transaction. The purpose rather is to provide a veneer of commercial respectability 
to the shifting of criminal funds in accordance with the motive of making these funds appear 
legitimate.186 This description would not suffice as fraud in the Fraud Act 2009. Nonetheless, only where 
the deception is properly evidenced, it may serve as an illegitimate purpose.187 
Hence, it is right that the legal circles should consider a perspective from forensic accounting 
where it is known that money laundering is not like any other normal commercial activity under forensic 
inspection.188 Even though the surface undertaking of money laundering may seem to be a normal 
activity, forensic accountants’ area of interest during investigation is where ‘the commercial veneer is 
bent or distorted to accommodate criminal purpose.’ 189  This is the part where offenders get the 
opportunity to apply minor deception which may lead to the unravelling of a major scheme of money 
laundering and fraud.190  
 
B.4 Findings: Application to corporation criminal liability  
Generally, as discussed from above, the mental element is often the complicated aspect of the money 
laundering offence. Similar to convicting an individual, it is also necessary to find corporation’s guilty 
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state of mind, to access if there is sufficient intention required to make it an offence. The intentions of 
an ‘artificial legal person’ can be given to a company through the identification principle.191  
The identification principle requires a company’s guilty state of mind to be proven with the 
‘directing mind and will’ of the company is behind the offence.192 Lord Diplock stated that to determine 
the agents, the actions and the state of mind of those who represents the company, one must look at 
the company’s memorandum and articles of association. This includes ‘the board of directors, the 
managing director and possibly other superior officers of the company’.193  
Nonetheless, in practice, it is proven to be inadequate hold large companies liable particularly 
with more resources liable for criminal wrongdoing. there remains a high threshold to establish 
corporate guilt, since higher ranking representatives of the company such as directors and senior 
officers will not be likely to be where the criminal activities take place..194 Rather, they are able to 
summon employees by way of bribery or threats to commit the deeds. In other ways, it encourages 
company to decentralise responsibilities to avoid liability.195  The consequent effect of having to prove 
intent from an individual occupying a senior position in the company causes prosecutors to find it difficult 
to convict large modern multinational corporation due to their complex management structures. As 
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opposed to smaller companies, where the management structures are much simpler and hence easier 
to hold those companies liable for the criminal wrongdoing.196  
Whilst conviction of individuals under money laundering offence are much more coherent, the 
company conviction under money laundering offences still offers complexity and hindrance to dispense 
justice. As of now, the Law Commission is currently reviewing the inconsistency in part of a wider 
consultation on criminal liability in regulatory contexts.197 So far, there is currently one consultation 
paper from Ministry of Justice titled Corporate Liability for Economic Crime: Call for Evidence and was 
published 2017. There have not been any updates ever since. 
 
C. Dual Criminality Requirement limitations.  
As discussed above, the very structure of large international corporation committing corporate 
financial crime involved a large network of entities working around the world to provide the best effective 
routes to launder the proceeds obtained from the predicate offence. Hence, it is out of necessity that 
states cooperate with one another to counter money laundering regime and corporate financial crimes. 
In order to do so, one of the first question states are confronted with is what to do with a request that 
relates to behaviour that do not suffice as an offence if committed in their jurisdiction.198  
 
C.1 The principle of dual criminality  
As far as transnational organised crime groups and international corporations are concerned, 
it is often found in the undertakings of international cooperation; international criminal law employs a 
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range of ‘double conditions.’199 And one common denominator of which is the requirements that two 
legal systems share a certain set of values or legal prescriptions;200 the principle of dual criminality.  
The highly contested principle of ‘dual criminality’ adopted into the criminality of money 
laundering offence depicts the classification of the offender’s criminal conduct insofar as it constitutes 
an offense under the laws of the two respective states.201 Hence, for an act to be extraditable, it must 
constitute  to a crime under the laws of both state requesting extradition and the state from which 
extradition is requested. In other words, they require some correspondence or conceptual similarity 
between the crime in the requesting and requested states. 
 
Stemming from the principle of legality (nulla poene sine lege), and also closely linked to state 
sovereignty and reciprocity,202 the principle is deemed necessary for the protection of individual rights 
and ensure reciprocity in the extradition practice.203 It was originally set as a mechanism to avoid states 
that were obliged to cooperate with respect to behaviour they did not consider criminally actionable. 
Nonetheless, some argue this principle constitutes to a major obstacle to effective cooperation 
and outdated. In addition to the inconvenience caused by the principle, the principle is interpreted and 
applied differently among different jurisdictions. The interpretation of the principle leans either in 
abstracto or in concreto. 
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C.2 ‘Im abstracto’ dual criminality  
 ‘In abstracto’ focus on objective examination of the conduct204, or rather the definition of the 
crime205 and the material circumstance of the offence. It disregards subjective and personal grounds of 
criminal liability.206 The interpretation focuses on the nature of the acts and the offence is extraditable 
when the acts of the accused qualify as bring a crime in the requested state.  
 
There are no specific standards of criminal law and procedure imposed by extradition state 
onto the requesting state.207 Rather, the main emphasis is whether or not the crime in the requested 
state is generally comparable to the crime in the requesting state208 and not on the sameness or identity 
of the label of the crime or the required legal elements needed to be proven.209  
Hence, there is no requirement to compare the crimes as described in the law of the countries. 
No concrete circumstances in the case is considered, and the relevant crimes do not need to have 
identical names or scope.210 Therefore, a person charged with predicate offence via money laundering 
without legal justification may be charged in different countries under different types of statues involving 
money laundering. The laws on money laundering may be labelled differently. Likewise, there are 
distinctions in the degree or types of predicate offence and different fundamentals required for each 
such offense. Nonetheless, the similarity between the requested and requesting state is in their general 
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elements. Both material element of one person engaging in conduct which evidently contributes to the 
laundering of money. The mental element of knowing the act constitutes to laundering of money.   
The fact that a person would be charged with a predicate offence of fraud whereas in another 
it is referred as wrongful deception would not be legally relevant to a finding that ‘dual criminality’ 
exists.211 This is by virtue that the underlying facts would give rise to a similar but not identical charge 
in requested state. 212 No consequence will be brought onto the requested state if the charge by the 
requested state is fraud or wrongful deception. As long as the crime charged, corresponds to an 
equivalent crime in the requested state.213  
 
C.3 ‘In concreto’ dual criminality  
‘In concerto’ involves a much rigorous interpretation and primarily attaches importance to both 
to all factual, personal and legal aspect.214 This interpretation requires an objective application of the 
rule in the requesting states and insists on strict correlation of the title of the offence and its legal 
elements as well as subjective elements such as the circumstantial factors.215 In other words, the 
accused must be punishable under concrete circumstances, meaning he is capable to bear criminal 
liability in both requesting and requested state. In the words of the Van den Wyngaert, in concreto can 
be explained as “ it is not sufficient for the crime to be punishable ‘in the books’; the judge must also 
look at the elements which, in the concrete circumstances, either justify or excuse the act (substantive 
elements) or make prosecution impossible (procedural impediments”216 Hence, there must be identical 
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labelling of the crime committed, identical legal elements or substantial similarity irrespective to the 
normative formulation or required elements.217 
 
Regardless of the two interpretation, there are also ways of interpretation that are a combination 
of these two methods. Most states can be classified into one of the two main groups of interpretation, 
but in general most states have adopted a specific method of interpretation that is unique to each 
particular state. This is thus no uniform method of interpretation in international criminal law.218  
 
C.4 Dual criminality in relation to money laundering regime 
In terms of criminal conduct or unlawful activity committed abroad that relates to the offence of money 
laundering, UK adopted mandatory ‘dual criminality’ requirement on predicate offences committed 
abroad in order for a money laundering offence to be found.219 
 
C.5 UK’s perspective 
In 2006, two key amendments were introduced by the UK government under Serious Organisation 
Crime and Police Act, one of which is the introduction of the dual criminality requirement. Upon resolving 
the single-criminality issue, this first set of amendment was designed as a defence specifically for a 
person charged with primary money laundering offence for their laundering acts occurred outside of the 
UK. This essentially, would place the suspect in a favourable position to the detriment on conditions 
placed on the transfer of proceedings or execution of foreign sentences.220 
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The dual criminality requirement or rather the ‘overseas conduct defence’, sets a person will not be 
found liable under the offence of money laundering under sections 327 to 329 if:  
 
a) He or she knew or reasonably believed that the relevant criminal conduct occurred abroad 
b) The relevant criminal conduct was not, when it took place, unlawful under the criminal law of 
that other country. 
Nonetheless, this limitation does not apply to conduct that (despite being legal under local law) would 
constitute an offence punishable by a maximum sentence of imprisonment over 12 months in the United 
Kingdom if it had occurred in the UK.Hence, most cases, such as bribery, corporate fraud and tax 
evasion, would be within the wide extraterritorial scope of POCA. Hence, the double criminality 
requirement is used under a broad and constructive approach.221  
 
R v Anwoir  
The first judicial discussion since the implementation of the ‘dual criminality requirement’ was 
seen in R v Anwoir222 where the courts have to consider whether it is required to prove at least the class 
or type of criminal conduct involved in generating the criminal property.223 In the judgement, the courts 
abstain in the need to prove the location of the underlying criminal conduct. Instead, it was agreed that 
the relevant issue should be directed on whether the conduct that was committed abroad would 
constitute a criminal offence in the UK had it occurred in the UK. 
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R v Rogers 
In the case of R v Rogers224 (2014), the Court of Appeal confirmed the principle. The facts set 
was Mr Rogers, a UK citizen resident in Spain, permitted money generated by a fraudulent scheme in 
the United Kingdom to be paid into a Spanish bank account that he controlled, and allowed another 
person, the launderer, to withdraw money from that account. He was convicted of s327(1)(c) of 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 of converting criminal property and consequently appealed against the 
conviction. 225The argument proposed was the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the offences 
against a non-UK resident where the relevant conduct occurred entirely outside the United Kingdom. 
Upon analysing the High Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal found that the High Court has 
erred in applying the wrong provision, s340(11)(d) of POCA, which defines ‘money laundering’ for the 
purposes of reporting obligations set out in section 330 and 332 and, the obligation set was irrespective 
of the laundering act was committed in the UK or abroad.226 
In reference to the provisions relating to the offence of money laundering, there was no 
particular definition of the term ‘money laundering’ provided.227 Rather, the court took an innovative 
approach to alter the ratio in favour of the same resulting effect that the erred judgement has provided. 
The court stated a modern approach to jurisdiction required ‘an adjustment to the circumstances of 
international criminality’. It denotes ‘the offence of money laundering is par excellence an offence that 
is no respecter of national boundaries. It would be surprising indeed if Parliament had not intended the 
Act to have extraterritorial effect (as we have found it did).’228 
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Libman v R 
To elevate their emphasis to move from usual norms in such circumstances as argued by the 
defence team, the courts strategically quoted La Forest J, a Canadian judge in Libman v R229 on the 
‘celebrated discussion’ by Lord Diplock of the boundaries of international comity in Treacy v Director of 
Public Prosecutions.230 The quote is as follows: “The English Courts have decisively begun to move 
away from definitional obsessions and technical formulations aimed at finding a single situs of a crime 
by locating where the gist of the crime occurred or where it was completed. Rather, they now appear to 
seek by an examination of relevant policies to apply the English criminal law where a substantial 
measure of the activities constituting a crime take place in England, and restrict its application in such 
circumstances solely in cases where it can seriously be argued on a reasonable view that these 
activities should, on the basis of international comity, be dealt with by another country.”231 
 
Hence, there was sufficient jurisdictional nexus to convict Mr Rogers on the basis that his act 
committed abroad suffice to be criminal property for the purposes of POCA and had impacted the victim 
in the UK and the laundering proceeds was found to have direct link to those acts in the UK.  
 
C.5 Findings 
This begs one to question has the traditional approach of the presumption against a 
Parliamentary intention to make acts done by foreigners abroad offences which can be tried by an 
English criminal court is even stronger than the position where a UK national is concerned.232 In the 
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words of Lord Russell in R v Jameson,233 “other general canon of construction is this, that if any 
construction otherwise be possible, an Act will not be construed as applying to foreigners in respect to 
acts done by them outside the dominions of the sovereign power enacting.”234 
By strictly looking at the judgement provided by the Courts in Rogers,235 it would seem so. The 
courts have taken a modern view of criminal jurisdiction; where the same considerations on a 
substantial measure of activities constituting the predicate fraud crime would appear to apply to those 
activities committed abroad. Considering where a different circumstance where the proceeds handled 
by Rogers were derived from a criminal conduct outside the UK. Would the decision in R v Rogers236 
be applied similarly to this circumstance?  
In applying the Court of Appeal decision on statutory construction, it would seem logical that 
the circumstance would not change the decision, Rogers would still be found liable. 237  As the 
interpretation of ‘criminal property’ includes monies derived from foreign conduct which would equate 
to criminal conduct in the UK it occurred here. Hence, it is possible criminal liability is found in the UK 
for the handling the criminal property abroad would arise.  
In practice, neither would a prosecuting authority would be interested in commencing criminal 
proceedings for money laundering where both the underlying criminal conduct and handling the 
proceeds of crime were committed abroad.238 
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However, it can also be said that the basis on the modern view of criminal jurisdiction the courts 
have adopted would not be as farfetched as one could deliberates from the court’s approach on the 
statutory construction. For as the Court of Appeal explained, with reference to the facts in R v Rogers, 
“This is not a case where the conversion of criminal property relates to the mechanics of a fraud which 
took place in Spain and which impacted upon Spanish victims. In those circumstances, our courts would 
not claim jurisdiction.”239 The importance on the criminality underlying the case that took place in 
England is the ‘continued deprivation of the victims of their monies’ and that leaves ‘no reasonable 
basis for withholding jurisdiction’.240 
 
These case and subsequent others indicate that a person may be guilty of a money laundering 
offence under section 327 to 329 of POCA in circumstances where both the predicate offending and 
the laundering of the criminal property take place outside the territory of the UK. 241 Consequently, this 
is reflected in s340(2)(b) Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 criminalise the laundering act committed abroad 
as a money laundering offence where the predicate offence committed abroad would also equates to 
an offence in any part of the United Kingdom if it occurred here. 
 
C.6 Will the principle of double criminality inhibit the prosecution of money laundering?  
The complexity in the structure of a money laundering scheme involves a network of individuals 
or entities based in different countries. As discussed above, the launderers would seek the most efficient 
routes to launder monies and that usually means picking a less developed country with weak anti-
money laundering regime with high level of corruption and bribery. It is prone to be in such 
circumstances, the country selected may not recognised certain conducts as criminal conduct like the 
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requesting state does. Particularly where some of corporate financial crime is still rather a contemporary 
crime in certain countries. For example, foreign bribery is not criminalised by Cambodian anti-corruption 
legislation. 242  Nonetheless, since foreign corruption statutes have extraterritorial applicability and 
companies may be prosecuted their acts conducted outside their home jurisdiction.243 
For the UK Bribery Act to apply, it is required to prove the offender who offer or accepted the 
bribe has a close connection to the United Kingdom.244 This includes companies incorporated in the 
United Kingdom as well as non-UK companies conducting business activities in the United Kingdom. If 
bribery was committed in Cambodia, the extraterritorial application of the act enables a corporation or 
person with a close UK connection to face prosecution in the UK.245 
 
C.7 Is there still a need for international cooperation? 
The contingency of an anti-money laundering measures being effective is highly dependent on 
international cooperation. A necessary consensus needs to be developed on an international basis.246 
In order to globalise the prosecution of money laundering, the prosecution of money laundering needs 
to be distanced from the original crime.247 In other words, there must be more emphasis on the money 
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that was proceeds of crime in comparison to proceeds of any particular crime in any particular 
jurisdiction.248 This would not be possible as long as money laundering is linked to a predicate offence. 
Where predicate offence exists in the equation, the deliberation of the policy options of the individual 
nation state in respect of any crime is in point will be subject to locality.249 For instance, if a largely 
autonomous nation state that wish to counter proceeds of drug sales would only have one alternative 
to the solution, which is a more liberal policy on drugs. In effect, it would lower the amount of proceeds 
by the crime and consequently the global sum of money obtained from illegal activity in that 
jurisdiction.250 Furthermore, any breach of those criminal law is specific to the jurisdiction because they 
are fixed to its own set of criminal law. This is so under the Westphalian model of sovereignty where 
each country was responsible for its own criminal law. There is no distribution and sharing of principles 
between countries as we have seen now in the contemporary era.  
 
D. Conclusion 
Looking back at the money laundering offences that holds individuals liable, it can be said that 
the recent development has elevated UK’s position in countering money laundering scheme. With the 
relaxation of the rule in predicate offence condition as well as the abolishing the principle of dual 
criminality in money laundering offences, it is worth nothing the developments has made it much easier 
for prosecution to find a corporate liable. Particularly where the mental element requires merely 
suspicion and that can be inferred, it would lessen the constraint found in the identification principle. 
Nevertheless, it is still uncertain as to whether corporate would be liable to money laundering offences. 
As of now, all one could do is observe and wait for the Parliament to approve of the recommended 
reform as proposed by the Ministry of Justice.  
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It is possible for fraud, bribery, tax evasion and money laundering to occur together. Even where 
the all offences had different modus operandi, motivation and seriousness. Nonetheless, one thing can 
be concluded which is the essence of these offences all benefit the corporation from ‘wrongdoing of 
associated persons acting in pursuit of contractual or commercial advantage or tax limitation’.251 This 
provides a strong reason for a need to hold corporations liable and upon so, requires a consistent 
framework. Corporate economic activity is international and consequently the economic crime is 
international as well as a national problem.  When considering a reform in corporate money laundering 
offence, it must be taken into consideration that corporate activity, both licit and illicit, utilises complex 
corporate structures, agents, intermediaries and subsidiaries. Hence, there is a need for mutual 
assistance between a number of international bodies and organisations in the investigation and 
prosecution process. This organisation can be the Council of Europe, Eurojust and the Europe 
Commission. The UK would have to ensure Brexit would not significantly impact the existing 
cooperative arrangements once UK is no longer part of Europe.  
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